The relationship between administrative courts and the executive in Poland reveals a structural tension already at the constitutional level. On the one hand, administrative courts are tasked with performing judicial review of public administration (Art. 184 of the Constitution), suggesting a one-directional influence: courts control the executive. On the other hand, the principle of separation and balance (sic!) of powers (Art. 10 section 1 of the Constitution) implies mutual interaction rather than strict division. As a result, the relationship between the Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) and the executive reflects a complex institutional reality shaped by both historical experience and contemporary practice.
Historical Background
Polish administrative justice has developed in a discontinuous and contested historical context. The interwar model, inspired by Austrian solutions, remained incomplete due to the outbreak of the Second World War. Then, at the beginning of the communist regime, administrative courts were entirely abolished, allowing the unchecked exercise of executive power. The SAC was re-established only after nearly forty years, still under an illiberal regime, which made its initial functioning particularly challenging. Despite this hostile environment, the SAC gradually built its authority as an institution capable of protecting individuals against the state.
This history has shaped the contemporary Polish model of administrative justice. Administrative courts are designed to remain structurally and functionally distant from the executive, acting primarily as external controllers rather than participants in administration. Their adjudication is therefore predominantly cassatory, focusing on eliminating unlawful acts rather than replacing administrative decisions with their own judgments.
The Influence of the Supreme Administrative Court on the Executive
The SAC influences the executive primarily through adjudication. Reviewing administrative acts sets standards of legality that shape how public administration operates in practice. The Constitution (Art. 184) provides that the Supreme Administrative Court and other administrative courts shall exercise, to the extent specified by statute, control over the performance of public administration. The SAC realises this mission primarily by hearing cassation appeals against judgments of regional administrative courts. As a result, in practice, it reviews administrative acts only indirectly – by reviewing the judgments of other administrative courts. Nevertheless, the SAC plays an important role in administrative law as the institution responsible for the uniformity of case law and the most important source of guidance for administrative authorities in how administrative processes should be handled.
At the same time, judicial review of public administration in Poland is institutionally fragmented. While administrative courts play a central role in this regard, ordinary courts adjudicate social security cases, where reformatory powers are considered more appropriate than cassation ones offered by administrative courts. In turn, the Constitutional Tribunal reviews the constitutionality of general acts of the executive. This division reflects a specific understanding of administrative justice à la polonaise, in which administrative courts focus primarily (although not exclusively) on the legality of individual acts within a cassatory adjudication framework, while general executive acts and cases requiring reformatory adjudication are heard mostly by other courts.
The Influence of the Executive on the Supreme Administrative Court
The executive exerts influence primarily at the managerial level. The President of the Republic determines the number of SAC judges and makes formal appointments, which, in times of constitutional tension, may acquire a political dimension, especially given the lack of judicial review of presidential appointments and the controversies surrounding the National Council of the Judiciary. Although the administrative judiciary is largely self-governed under the strong authority of the SAC President, the President of the Republic retains important competencies, including appointing the SAC President (from among candidates proposed by the assembly of SAC judges) and shaping the rules governing the SAC’s bureaucratic functioning.
Another specificity of Polish administrative justice is that public prosecutors may initiate and join ongoing court proceedings to protect the rule of law. In this context, the Polish law is characterised by the protection, by quasi-administrative authorities, of both subjective rights and freedoms, the role played by ombudsmen, and the objective legal order (the principle of legality), exercised by the public prosecution, alongside its main mission of fighting crime.
Recent years have also revealed that the stability of the administrative justice, taken for granted after the fall of the communist rule, is only an illusion. Indeed, the increasing polarisation of society and the ongoing constitutional crisis pose a significant risk to the SAC, potentially undermining its legitimacy and capacity to administer justice. Whereas administrative courts were not “taken over” by politicians, they sometimes struggle with mounting political pressure and the reluctance of central executive authorities to enforce their judgments in politically sensitive cases.
Balancing Institutional Challenges
The Polish model of administrative justice is characterised by a strong structural separation from the executive, combined with a significant degree of internal self-governance. At the same time, the President of the Republic retains a unique position, exercising key organisational competences. This relationship has both advantages and risks: presidential involvement has, in some instances, protected administrative courts from reforms that threaten judicial independence, while in others, it has contributed to institutional tensions, particularly in the area of judicial appointments.
Ultimately, the Polish experience illustrates that the relationship between administrative courts and the executive is inherently ambivalent: it combines structural separation with unavoidable interdependence. While the SAC has consistently sought to remain distant from political dynamics, its position still depends on institutional arrangements shaped in part by the executive, as well as the latter’s willingness to respect its judgments.
Piotr Ostrowski – PhD candidate at the Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań, Poland
Wojciech Piątek – professor at the Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań, Poland
Ostrowski, Piotr, Piątek, Wojciech. 2026. ‘The relationships between the supreme administrative courts and the executive power in the example of Poland. In Beyond Adjudication, edited by Wojciech Piątek. Edward Elgar Publishing, pp. 80-102.