Urgent by email: the derogation file the European Parliament never sees, by Marta Liduma

The Treaties require the European Commission to consult widely before proposing legislation, and an agreement with the European Parliament and the Council commits the Commission to assess the impact of significant initiatives. For proposals regarded as urgent, the Commission may dispense with one or both steps by a decision known as a derogation. In November 2025 the European Ombudsman found maladministration in three such cases, one concerning Omnibus I, the February 2025 package amending the European Union (EU) rules on corporate sustainability reporting and due diligence. The Parliament learns how a derogation was decided only from the explanatory memorandum, and I argue that the Parliament should ask to see the record of that decision.

Two texts adopted in April 2026 set different tests. On 28 April 2026 the President of the Commission signed the revised Framework Agreement with the European Parliament, under point 53 of which the Commission may ask the Parliament to decide urgently only “where justified by unforeseen developments”, in writing and with reasons. The same day the Commission adopted a Communication, “A Simpler, Clearer and Better Enforced EU Rulebook”, whose parameters for granting a derogation include a “political context creating a need for urgent action”. Alberto Alemanno has called for “objective, legally binding criteria” on when consultation may be limited or an impact assessment omitted, and for confining omnibus legislation, which amends several acts at once, within “a dedicated regime”. Jeroen Koomans would anchor urgency criteria in the 2016 Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making. Criteria help the Parliament, however, only if the Parliament can see how they were applied.

A proposal prepared under a derogation should therefore reach the Parliament with what I call the derogation file, made up of the record of who sought the derogation and why, the list of organisations consulted in place of the public, and a statement of whether the urgency meets the test in point 53, because the Parliament answers for the evidence on which it legislates. What such a file is worth became visible on 21 October 2026, when Transparency International EU (TI EU) published the list of those consulted on Omnibus I. The report on better law-making for 2025 and 2026, which the Parliament’s Committee on Legal Affairs has still to draft, is the place to ask.

What the rules require

Article 11(3) of the Treaty on European Union requires the Commission to “carry out broad consultations with parties concerned”, and under Article 2 of Protocol No 2 on subsidiarity and proportionality the Commission “shall consult widely” before proposing legislative acts, except in “cases of exceptional urgency”, when the Commission “shall give reasons for its decision in its proposal”. Neither agreement between the institutions lets the Commission drop an impact assessment or a consultation because a proposal is urgent. Point 53 of the Framework Agreement covers only the case in which the Commission asks the Parliament to hurry. Under point 13 of the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making of 2016 the Commission assesses initiatives with significant economic, environmental or social impacts. Under point 19 the Commission “will, before adopting a proposal, conduct public consultations” and must send the results “without delay to both co-legislators”, and the one carve-out, for agreements between the social partners under Article 155(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, has nothing to do with urgency.

The derogation exists only in the Better Regulation rules, the guidelines the Commission follows when it prepares proposals. Under the April Communication the Commissioner responsible for better regulation grants derogations, each to be “duly documented, recorded in a transparent manner” and reported in the explanatory memorandum, with an analytical staff working document within three months. Who may ask for a derogation, the Communication does not say, and nothing in it requires the Parliament or the Council to be told. The three cases the Ombudsman examined concerned two November 2023 proposals against migrant smuggling, a March 2024 amendment to the Common Agricultural Policy and Omnibus I. The Ombudsman has called the political-context parameter “a too vague statement” (decision of 23 June 2026, para 40).

An email that gave no reason

The derogation for Omnibus I was granted by an email that gave no reason. Eight civil society organisations complained to the Ombudsman in April 2025. The email, undated in her recommendation of November 2025, was sent by the then Deputy Secretary-General for Policy Coordination, in consultation with the cabinet, or private office, of the Commissioner for Implementation and Simplification, to the cabinet of the Commissioner responsible for the initiative, and said that a “Staff Working Document” should be prepared (recommendation, para 30). No reason for the decision was given (recommendation, para 57). The consultation went with the assessment, since the Commission held that once the impact assessment had been waived “a separate derogation was therefore not required” (para 69). In its place the Commission relied on earlier exchanges and a two-day reality check in February 2025 with stakeholders, mostly from industry, whose selection it could not explain (para 71). The proposal therefore lacked both an impact assessment and a full public consultation of the kind point 19 of the 2016 agreement promises, although the urgency clauses in Protocol No 2 and point 53 both require reasons.

The TI EU list is the Commission’s own record of who attended a roundtable on 6 February 2025, which TI EU says took the place of a public consultation. Of the 110 organisations listed, at least two-thirds were business interests. The Commission had not published the participants, and TI EU obtained the list through a confirmatory access-to-documents application 17 months later, after the Omnibus I Directive had been adopted. TI EU attributes the omission to “a loophole in the transparency rules on disclosing meetings with lobbyists”. Reality checks raise the same problem of publication. The April Communication names them among the consultation tools for urgent initiatives, and the Ombudsman opened an inquiry on 2 July 2026 into a complaint that the Commission exempts them from its standard transparency measures.

The Parliament is the defendant when evidence is missing

In the Ombudsman’s assessment it is “primarily the role of the co-legislators to decide whether they have received sufficient evidence from the Commission” (recommendation, para 64), and the Court of Justice has given that allocation legal effect. In the Mobility Package judgment of 4 October 2024, on actions by seven Member States against the Parliament and the Council, the Court annulled the eight-week return obligation for hauliers’ vehicles in Regulation 2020/1055 because the Parliament and the Council “have not established that they had sufficient information at their disposal” to judge its proportionality. A derogation is one route by which the co-legislators can come to lack sufficient information. Without an impact assessment and a public consultation, the Parliament weighs whatever the Commission has assembled, and the consequence of adopting on too little evidence falls on the Parliament and the Council, which adopt the legislation.

The Parliament can make up for a missing impact assessment by asking the European Parliamentary Research Service for a substitute. The complainants in the migration case pointed out that the Parliament had done so for the two proposals against migrant smuggling. A missing consultation cannot be made up for in that way, because once the proposal exists its options have been chosen. The analytical document that replaces an impact assessment can also come too late, and in the Common Agricultural Policy case it appeared seven months after the co-legislators had adopted the legislation (recommendation, para 65).

Ask for the derogation file

The report the Committee on Legal Affairs has still to draft should ask for the three documents by name with every proposal prepared under a derogation, because the Parliament receives the general answer already. Under point 17 of the Framework Agreement the Commission must reply in writing within three months to the specific requests in each resolution, and the reply to the report the Parliament adopted on 10 March 2026 cited the Ombudsman’s three cases, said the Commission had “clarified the procedures that apply in urgent cases”, and listed the same political context among its criteria. The Ombudsman’s own proposal, put to the Committee on Legal Affairs on 28 September 2026, was that the report “invite the Commission to report back to Parliament on how it has implemented these recommendations”. A request in those terms would draw the same passage again.

The record would name who asked, on what grounds, and who granted the derogation, as the Ombudsman recommended in November 2025. For Omnibus I that record is the Deputy Secretary-General’s email to the responsible Commissioner’s cabinet. The Commission has promised to record derogations “in a transparent manner”, but its opinion to the Ombudsman “does not present any measure specifically addressing” how requests from the political level will be recorded (decision, para 42), although in all three cases the requests came from the Deputy Secretary-General and the political level of the Commission. The participant list is owed under point 19 of the 2016 agreement, which obliges the Commission to send the results of stakeholder consultations to both co-legislators.

The Omnibus I proposal described competitiveness as a matter of “critical urgency” (recommendation, para 52). One more sentence would have said whether that urgency was an unforeseen development, the test of point 53, or a legal deadline. Point 53 already contains the kind of criterion Koomans asks for, namely that urgency be “justified by unforeseen developments”, and the Commission accepted it in April.

I accept that point 53 and the derogation concern different decisions. One asks the Parliament to shorten its own procedure, and the other concerns the preparation of a proposal inside the Commission. The difference does not make the derogation an internal matter, because what a derogation suspends is owed to the Parliament and the Council under points 13 and 19 of the 2016 agreement, and the Commission has undertaken in point 54 of the Framework Agreement to publish impact assessments, which are no less internal. The request also leaves the margin of discretion the Commission claimed (decision, para 21) untouched and asks only for a record of how it was exercised.

The Dutch foreign minister told the Eerste Kamer in August 2026 that institutional balance is not at stake in the omnibus procedure, and saw no added value (“geen meerwaarde”) in the restrictive interinstitutional framework Alberto Alemanno has proposed, namely the dedicated regime for omnibus legislation mentioned above. Three documents requested in a non-legislative report amend no agreement and bind no one. Alemanno would have the co-legislators refuse urgency classifications the Commission treats as immune from inter-institutional challenge, though the Parliament approved the urgent procedure for the “stop-the-clock” directive on 1 April 2025, and a refusal decided without the derogation file would be no better informed. A resolution cannot compel the Commission either, though under point 17 a refusal would have to come in writing within three months.

The next proposal prepared under a derogation will reach the Parliament with an explanatory memorandum, an analytical document due within three months, and whatever else the Commission decides to attach. Whether the email granting the derogation is among those papers is for the report to settle.

Posted by Marta Liduma


Marta Liduma is an LLB candidate in International and European Law at the University of Groningen and a corporate legal specialist working on cross-border commercial contracts and financial regulatory compliance. She writes on European Union institutional and administrative law, financial regulation and payment infrastructure. Recent publications include “Decorative by Design” (Verfassungsblog) and “Sovereignty by Contract” (Queen Mary Law Journal, vol 7 issue 1).


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