In principle, EU sanctions are not directed against individuals merely because they express anti-EU or pro-Russian political opinions. However, since February 2022, designations have increasingly targeted communicative, dissemination, and even artistic activities that the Council characterises as contributing to Russia’s war of aggression, as well as its hybrid warfare against Europe and foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI). This raises an important constitutional question. While freedom of expression under Article 11 of the EUCFR is not absolute and may be restricted under the conditions laid down in Article 52(1) (as illustrated in the landmark case T-125/22 RT France v Council), can speech itself justify an individual designation under EU sanctions law?
Traditionally, individual listings have targeted persons because of their status, for example, for their leading position within strategic sectors of the Russian economy or the state apparatus, or their conduct, such as financing Russia’s aggression, facilitating sanctions circumvention or participating in serious human rights violations. Speech rarely constituted the sole legal basis for designation. Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, however, the Council has progressively expanded its understanding of sanctionable conduct to encompass activities performed in the information domain. As Hillebrandt has observed, disinformation and propaganda are increasingly framed as hybrid threats capable of undermining democratic resilience, public order and the security of the Union. Accordingly, the Council has increasingly identified targets among journalists, media figures and even EU nationals for what they have said publicly or shared online.
The restrictive measures against Russian state-controlled media outlets, discussed by Lonardo, marked an important first step in the introduction of content-based sanctions. More recent developments go even further. They suggest that the Council is now willing to target not only media outlets, whether or not directly controlled by Russia, and individuals who share (or rather re-share), in their personal capacity, context which originate from sanctioned Russian outlets (as illustrated in case C-67/25, Traugott Ickeroth), but also journalists, bloggers, political commentators, artists, academics and media figures, accused of promoting or amplifying pro-Kremlin narratives. Recent listings suggest an expansion toward what may be described as content-based or narrative-based designations. The issue becomes particularly problematic where designated individuals are neither public officials of the Russian state, nor work for state-controlled media outlets, but mere commentators or public figures publicly expressing their opinions. Recent designations confirm that individuals, irrespective of their status or nationality, are added to the EU sanctions list because of their allegedly active role in spreading propaganda and disinformation aimed at justifying Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. The listing of the British blogger Graham Phillips and the French commentator Adrien Bocquet in March 2026 demonstrates the EU’s increased attention to (alleged) information manipulation activities occurring outside Russia.
The coexistence of two complementary sanctions regimes reinforces this tendency. Under the sanctions regime for Russian destabilising actions in Ukraine (Council Decision 2014/145), individuals may be listed for their support to actions or policies undermining Ukraine’s territorial integrity. By contrast, the more recent regime addressing Russian destabilising activities in Europe (Council Decision 2024/2643) expressly targets those planning, directing or facilitating information manipulation, disinformation campaigns and other forms of destabilising activities. Together, these regimes significantly broaden the informational dimension of EU sanctions. Individuals may now face designation not only because they allegedly support Russia’s military aggression, but also because they are considered to contribute to the dissemination of narratives regarded as serving Russian geopolitical interests – not necessarily related to the war in Ukraine.
The practical consequences of such listings should not be underestimated. Formally, individual designations do not regulate free speech. They impose travel bans and asset freezes on listed individuals rather than direct speech restrictions. Yet, as Hofer observes, their practical effects can significantly interfere with individual freedoms. Journalists may be prevented from travelling, establishing professional connections, or continuing economic activities within the EU. Artists and performers may lose the possibility to work or perform in Europe (see case T-460/24, Gagarina v Council). The General Court found that an artist’s participation in propaganda events, wearing symbols of military support, performing songs with patriotic connotations before audiences of soldiers and political figures, including President Putin, cannot be regarded as neutral conduct, disconnected from State propaganda (paras. 91 and 102). The concept of ‘support’ under EU Russia sanctions is thus interpreted to include to expressive conduct and artistic performances where the political context, visual elements and audience render a propaganda purpose clearly identifiable. Consequently, while EU sanctions do not directly censor speech, they can lawfully target artists for participating in public events (such as in their capacity as singers) – irrespective of whether they are directly involved in any action or policy relating to the war in Ukraine. In this way, sanctions substantially affect the conditions under which expression takes place. The difficulty lies in identifying where the line should be drawn between, on the one hand, active support for Russian policies and FIMI, and, on the other hand, the exercise of freedom of expression under Article 11 of the EUCFR. The General Court in Gagarina held that the interference of EU sanctions with the applicant’s freedom of expression was not disproportionate. The Court found that sanctions do not affect the applicant’s right to create and share her musical works: “They restrict only one channel through which the applicant may share her music, namely concerts within the territory of the European Union, a territory which she is not authorised to enter or transit through. The applicant, a national and resident of a third country, namely the Russian Federation, remains authorised to pursue her artistic activities in that country and to generate income there” (para 132).
The Court of Justice (CJEU) has so far adopted a broad understanding of support, including “narrative support” to Russia. Already in 2017, in the Kiselev case, the General Court held that freedom of expression carries “duties and responsibilities” and that sanctions could legitimately target journalistic activities contributing to propaganda in favour of the Russian government. The Court emphasised that freedom of expression “does not constitute an unfettered prerogative” and may be restricted under the conditions of Article 52(1) of the EU Charter. Crucially, “support” was interpreted broadly, extending beyond material assistance to activities contributing to the promotion or legitimisation of governmental policies.
The Court’s approach suggests that expressive activities may themselves constitute sanctionable support where they actively reinforce Russia’s political objectives or take place in public events. “Narrative support” emerges as a potentially new category of sanctionable conduct. Yet this development raises new difficult questions: when does mere political opinion become active support? Does endorsement become sanctionable because of its content, its effects, or the actor expressing it? Whether this development remains compatible with the Union’s constitutional commitment to freedom of expression, pluralism and democratic principles remains uncertain (see Article 21 TEU).
Comparative developments in the United States demonstrate that similar constitutional dilemmas are emerging beyond the EU legal order. In the ongoing litigation concerning sanctions imposed on the UN Special Rapporteur, Francesca Albanese, (L.C. et al v. TRUMP et al), the central issue is whether OFAC sanctions may lawfully be imposed because of her speech – more precisely, Albanese’s public advocacy and her non-binding recommendations that the International Criminal Court investigates alleged war crimes committed by Israeli and U.S. nationals. By granting a preliminary injunction, the District Court of Columbia concluded that the plaintiffs (i.e., Albanese’s child and husband) were likely to succeed on their First Amendment claim because the designation appeared to target the ideas expressed rather than unlawful conduct. Although that decision has subsequently been stayed pending appeal and the sanctions have been reinstated by the Trump administration, the litigation remains unresolved and illustrates a broader constitutional debate concerning the distinction between sanctioning conduct and sanctioning speech. While the EU and U.S. constitutional frameworks differ substantially, both legal systems are increasingly confronted with the same underlying question: when can speech itself amount to sanctionable conduct? And when do sanctions amount to unlawful censorship?
Ultimately, the debate concerns more than Russian propaganda. It concerns the changing nature of sanctions themselves: whether they remain instruments directed at conduct, institutional affiliation or material support, or whether they increasingly become mechanisms capable of targeting narratives and public appearances. Whether EU law permits such an evolution, and the CJEU will reconcile it with the Union’s constitutional commitment to freedom of expression, may become one of the pressing questions of the next generation of sanctions litigation (see, among others, pending cases T-862/25, Mizaev v Council; T-176/25, Belyavtseva v Council; T-169/26, Baud v Council; T-429/25, Dogru and AFA Medya v Council; T-582/25, Yamb v Council).
Posted by Francesca Finelli (Luxembourg School of Business)
This post is the third one in a series entitled ‘The EU’s restrictive measures against Russian media outlets and ‘foreign information manipulation and interference’: Issues of effectiveness, legality and principle’. The Introduction and other pieces can be found by clicking on this link.